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CASE COMMENTS
type of legislation which is anticipatory in nature wherein the
parties affected fully realize the results that will follow when the
provisions of the Act are invoked against them. This, as previously
noted, has given a measure of protection and advantage to one of
the private parties rather than the public. The district courts are
then called upon, apparently not to adjudicate the rights of the
parties and to grant appropriate relief, but merely to "rubber
stamp" administrative determinations. To forestall such results in
the future it is suggested that the L.M.R.A. be amended. Massachusetts has enacted a type of legislation of an ad hoc nature
which appears to produce a more desirable settlement of disputes
affecting the public interest.
The Massachusetts legislation places the power of discretionary
action upon the parties in dispute in the executive branch of the
government. The legislation grants the governor wide discretion
in approach to settlement, even to the extreme of government
seizure. Under this legislative approach the parties in dispute do
not anticipate the full import of their actions. Consequently, the
vague threat of active government intervention, without warning,
has proved conducive to speedy settlement of injurious strikes or
lockouts. For a full discussion of this legislative approach, authored
by the late Sumner Slichter of Harvard, see Schultz, The Massachusetts Choice-of-Procedures Approach to Emergency Disputes,
10 IND. & LAB. BEL. Rv. 359 (1956-57).
Until such time as Congress shall legislate a different approach
in regards National Emergency disputes and concomitant protections of both the public interest and that of free collective bargaining, the mandate, once requisite findings are made, is upon
the judiciary to act as surely as it is upon the interests limited
by the issuance of the injunction to acquiesce.
C. H. H. II
CoNDmoN
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Oi. Am GAs-M~mAI RoYALrY Dmz-Iu
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THAT TEMPOBARY CEssATION OF PRoDucrioN AFrR FiuX
Dos NoT TmnmNAT BIGHT To RoYATrs.-Petitioners held a
term royalty deed entitling them to mineral royalties for fifteen
years and so long thereafter as minerals were produced in paying
quantities. Paying production was continuous beyond the primary
term, until two law suits between respondents and a certain lessee,
plus concomitant mechanical failures, caused a cessation thereof
for 174 days. Petitioners sued for a declaratory judgment that their
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mineral royalty interest had not expired due to the temporary
cessation of production. Held, in the absence of express provisions
it was necessarily implied in the royalty deed that a temporary
interruption of production would not terminate the interest. Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 322 S.W.2d 944 (Texas 1959).
Because a review of the West Virginia cases has revealed no
great amount of litigation concerning the particular type of royalty
instrument in issue, a brief discussion of its nature and function
may be helpful to set the perspective for what follows.
A, term royalty deed conveys an interest in the gross production of a mineral tract, without the right to participate in the execution of, the bonus payable for, or the delay rentals to accrue under
mineral leases executed by the owner of the mineral fee estate. For
this reason the interest is commonly referred to as a non-participating
royalty interest. It should be borne in mind that the owner of a
mere royalty interest has neither a present nor a prospective possessory interest in the land; that he owns no part of the minerals
(as such) in place and that he does not become a cotenant in the
mineral estate. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957). The term royalty has thus been properly
characterized as a right only to share in the royalties of existing or
future leases, or as a right only to share in future production. Bliss,
Production Under Term-Royalty and Term-MineralDeeds, 86 Texas
L. Rev. 486 (1958). The conveyance of royalty for a term may bo
in one of two forms: a fixed term only, or a fixed term and as long
thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities. It was
the latter type with which the court was concerned in the principal
case.

The Texas court noted that there were no cases in its jurisdiction discussing the problem of temporary cessation of production
after the fixed term, production being had within that term, under
habendum clauses of term royalty deeds. But the dearth of cases
exactly in point posed no great stumbling block for the court, for
an easy resort was had to litigation involving the precise question
in leases; consequently, the case has a dual effect. It constitutes a
strong precedent for any future cases involving term royalty deeds
with this point in issue and it amounts to an equally solid addition
to the law that allows a bona fide temporary cessation of production under a lease without the severe result of termination of the
lessee's estate.
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Disregarding the fact that they applied to a term royalty deed
rather than a lease (to both of which they are equally and properly applicable), the principles upon which the decision was based
are certainly not unique. The discernible pattern in this area has
been one of judicial mitigation of the harshness of automatic termination through construction and estoppel. SumiavAN, OM. AN
GAs LAw, § 43 (1955). Even though a literal interpretation of the
habendum clause would dictate otherwise, it is now a wellestablished principle that a temporary cessation of production
during the indefinite term owing to mechanical or physical difficulties does not terminate the lease. 2 Su mmns, Om AND GAs
§ 305 n.19 (2d ed. 1959).
Equally discernible is a pattern of judicial carelessness in the
drive for liberal interpretations of habendum clauses. This carelessness stems from a failure to distinguish between cases involving
temporary cessation of production during the indefinite term, production being had within the definite term (in which case the
liberal treatment in favor of non-termination is justified) and, on
the other hand, cases extending the lease into the indefinite term
even though no production was had within the definite term. The
necessity of making this distinction is of vital legal importance, as
a brief resum6 of West Virginia cases will show.
In two later West Virginia cases (to be discussed presently),
Ammons v. Toothman, 59 W. Va. 165, 53 S.E. 13 (1906), has been
cited as authority for the proposition that a temporary interruption after production in the primary term will not cause a termination of the right to oil royalties. In that case a producing well had
been drilled within the specific term. After the expiration of the
term, the well ceased to produce and the lessee diligently set to
work to sink the well still deeper into another producing sand.
There was an actual cessation of production, but no abandonment
on the part of the lessee and, at heavy cost, the lessee proceeded
to restore production; however, the relative worth of the case is
questionable because the controversy arose between the land
owners and the lessee's right to produce oil from the lower stratum
was not litigated. The cases subsequent to Ammons are slightly

more helpful.
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438,76 S.E. 961
(1912), oil was discovered within the fixed term, but production
was in token quantities only. Nonetheless, the court held that the
diligent efforts of the lessee in trying to increase production and in

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 15

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
trying to find other sources, continued the lease in force after the
primary term and that the failure to produce in the indefinite term
did not constitute a termination. The clause "as oil or gas is produced" was interpreted in light of the entire lease to mean "as long
as the premises are diligently and efficiently operated, provided
minerals shall have been discovered within the fixed term." Representing what seems to be the outside limit in construction, the
court at 457 stated that: " Produced,' 'produced in paying quantities' and 'found in paying quantities' must mean about the same
thing, else substance will be subordinated to shadow or mere
technicality."
Anderson v. Schaffner, 90 W. Va. 225, 110 S.E. 566 (1922),
while holding that absolute cessation terminated the lease in question, admitted that non-compliance therewith was excused when a
high degree of diligence was exercised by a lessee under circumstances presumed to have been foreseen and contemplated by the
parties.
IThe West Virginia cases just discussed are the representative
ones in support of the doctrine of the principal case-that a temporary interruption during the indefinite term, production having
been had within the fixed term, will not cause a termination of the
lease. Admittedly they are not as strong as one might desire, but
they at least show the tendency of the court. Now the discussion
turns to cases where judicial interpretative liberalism is manifested
with at least one important fact difference-there was no production within the primary term. The results in these cases are the
same--continuance of the lease-but the foundations upon which
these results must rest are of questionable validity.
In Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 886
(1908), the lessee started drilling operations two months before
the end of the fixed term and, about one month later, struck a gas
well with substantial producing potential; however, the lessee
decided to drill more deeply, but struck no more gas until one day
after the expiration of the fixed term. It was held that the discovery of the gas in the upper stratum created a vested estate in
the lessee, which estate was not lost by further drilling without
production. The lessors employees had interfered with the operation during the initial term. How much influence this interference
had in the outcome of the case is purely a matter of conjecture.
McGraw Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S.E. 1027
(1909), concerned a lease for five years and as long thereafter as
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there was production. A large gas well was drilled within the
fixed term but the gas was not marketed owing to the lack of a
pipe line, and the well was capped. Subsequently the lessor accepted seven payments of the annual rental. The court held that a
capped well was equivalent to a producing well so long as the flat
well-rentals were paid. A similar result was reached where the
lessee shut off the gas for want of a market. McCutcheon v. Enon
Oil and Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 185 S.E. 288 (1926).
A federal case in this area, Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F.2d 111
(4th Cir. 1939), refused to follow the trend of the West Virginia
cases, although it purported to follow local law in its decision. In
that case, three producing wells ceased operating three years
before the end of the term. Three of the lessor's heirs rejected
tenders of rent and sought cancellation. It was held that the lease
had terminated as to the three malcontents. The decision has been
strongly criticized, Williams & Goodwin, Oil and Gas Law in the
Federal Court, 46 W. Va. L. Q. 154 (1940), but there is ample
room for arguing that the decision was grounded upon permanent,
rather than temporary, cessation and from this point of view is not
at variance with local law.
The latter West Virginia cases stand for the proposition that
payment of rentals or mere discovery of oil or gas are sufficient to
vest an estate in the lessee and thus extend the lease. But there is
no ambiguity in the clause "is produced" and the failure to have
"produced" should preclude any vesting. The difference in the two
sets of cases is that in the former, estates have vested through
production in the primary term whereas in the latter the necessary
condition precedent for vesting has not occurred. In one, continuance of the vested estate in the face of temporary interruptions is
quite proper, the only problem being a question of fact, i.e., is the
interruption really temporary? In the other, there is actually no
estate to be continued. Cognizance has been taken of this disparity
in a most incisive manner in DoNix, THE LAw OF CoAL, On. A
GAs N WEsT VmRGNA AND VmIm-I §§ 70, 72 (1951). But as so
often happens, salient criticism to the contrary, the cases represent the law in this jurisdiction. And, notwithstanding their incongruities, they serve as a good indication that our court would
have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion of the principal
case on similar facts.
E. P. K.
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